Biography
A three-time recipient of the American Accounting Associationâs Notable Contributions to Management Accounting Research Award and a winner of the 2020 Management Accounting Research David Solomons Prize, Sedatole brings a synthesis of business acumen and academic expertise to her role as Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Accounting. She previously served as the Interim John H. Harland Dean of Goizueta Business School from May 2020 through June 2022.
Karenâs pioneering research into the field of performance measurement and reward systems, the role of forecasting and budgetary systems within organizations, and control in interorganizational collaborations have added enormous value across academic and business spheres. In her research, she places emphasis on the role of trust, positive motivation, and systems thinking in the workplace. In tackling these issues, she has partnered across industries â health care, tech, automotive, and more â generating business-relevant research and earning her the Impact on Management Accounting Practice Award twice. Karenâs research has merited grants from the PwC Charitable Foundation, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, and the Institute of Management Accountants. She has also demonstrated her commitment to Goizuetaâs core value of principled leadership, serving as Faculty Director for Emory Executive Educationâs Executive Womenâs Leadership Forum.
Prior to joining the Emory faculty in 2017, Karen was the Russell E. Palmer Endowed Professor of Accounting at Michigan State University. She has also held academic appointments at the University of Texas at Austin and the Stephen F. Austin State University.
She has presented her research at numerous national and international conferences. Her effective forecasting and performance measurement articles have been published in a number of leading journals, including The Journal of Accounting Research, The Accounting Review, and the Harvard Business Review. Karen previously served as senior editor of the Journal of Management Accounting Research.
Karen holds a PhD in business administration from the University of Michigan, a masters of business administration from the University of Texas at Austin, and a bachelor of science in engineering from Baylor University.
Education
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PhD in Business AdministrationUniversity of Michigan
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MBA in Business AdministrationUniversity of Texas at Austin
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BS in EngineeringBaylor University
The immunization effect of internal control system transparency following a supplierâs violation of buyer trust
Making the most of supplier industry competition through incentive contracting
The folly of forecasting: The effects of a disaggregated demand forecasting system on forecast error, forecast positive bias, and inventory levels
When one size does not fit all: Mitigating heterogeneous compensation risk through subjective evaluations
Firms typically use a âone-size-fits-allâ (OSFA) compensation contract that specifies a common formulaic relation between performance and compensation (i.e., a performance bonus) for non-executive managers in similar jobs. However, a contract that is appropriate on average, may be suboptimal for individual managers if heterogeneity in the operating environment creates varying compensation risk. We use field data from a retail firm that introduced an OSFA bonus compensation plan for its store managers. The common bonus formula is based on a weighted sum of objective measures of performance and a subjective rating made by supervisors. The firm intended the supervisorsâ discretionary subjective rating to evaluate performance on dimensions that are difficult to measure (e.g., store appearance). We test and find that supervisors give uniformly higher subjective ratings to managers whose objective measure of sales performance is measured with greater noise, and to managers who face higher performance target difficulty, the latter assessed both prior to (ex ante) and subsequent to (ex post) the evaluation period. These results obtain after controlling for manager ability and performance, and for alternative mechanisms to mitigate differences in compensation risk (e.g., salary changes, sales target changes, and bonus adjustments). The evidence suggests that supervisors use discretion in subjective ratings to provide manager-specific risk premiums for non-executive managers who are subject to an OSFA contract.
The role of calibration committees in subjective performance evaluation systems
Featured in Harvard Business Review, November-December 2018.
We provide the first empirical evidence of the role that calibration committees play in subjective performance evaluation systems. Using proprietary data from a large multinational organization, we begin by showing that calibration committees adjust ratings sparingly (i.e., 25% adjustment rate), but when they do, downward adjustments are significantly more frequent and of greater magnitude than upward adjustments. Calibration committees tend to downward (upward) adjust ratings of supervisors who give higher (lower) than average initial ratings. Taken together, calibration committees improve the consistency of ratings across supervisors and mitigate leniency bias, but exacerbate centrality bias. We also show that calibration committees facilitate the appropriate allocation of decision rights by deferring rating decisions to supervisors who possess a relatively greater information advantage. That is, calibration committees are less likely to adjust the rating of a subordinate who is further removed from committee members in the organizational hierarchy. Finally, we show that calibration committees promote supervisor learning about organizational performance rating expectations through calibration adjustments. This study contributes to the literature on performance evaluation by providing new insights regarding the organizational dynamics of subjective performance evaluation systems when decision rights span hierarchical levels of the organization.
The implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence on individual performance
Do the incentive effects of relative performance measurement vary with the ex ante probability of promotion?
Do extant management control frameworks fit the alliance setting? A descriptive analysis
The use of management controls to mitigate risk in strategic alliances: Field and survey evidence
The use of contract adjustments to lengthen the CEO horizon in the presence of internal and external monitoring
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Evidence on the cost hierarchy: The association between resource consumption and production activities
Sticks and carrots: An experimental investigation of contract frame and effort in agency relationships
Winner of the 2010 AAA MAS Research Conference Outstanding Paper Award.
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The use of management control mechanisms to mitigate moral hazard in the decision to outsource
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The use of collaborative interfirm contracts in the presence of task and demand uncertainty
Integrated information systems and alliance partner trust
Employeesâ subjective valuations of their stock options: Evidence on the distribution of valuations and the use of simple anchors
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Drivers and consequences of short-term production decisions: Evidence from the auto industry
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An empirical examination of goals and performance-to-goal following the introduction of an incentive bonus plan with participative goal-setting
Winner of the 2006 AAA MAS Research Conference Outstanding Paper Award.
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Transient institutional ownership and CEO contracting
Improvements in the information content of non-financial forward-looking performance measures: A taxonomy and application
Measuring customer relationship value: The role of switching cost
The effect of control systems on trust and cooperation in collaborative environments
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